Due to the simplicity of the concept and the availability of attack tools, launching a DoS attack is relatively easy, while defending a network resource against it is disproportionately difficult. The first step of a protection scheme against DoS must be the detection of its existence, ideally before the destructive traffic build-up. In this paper we propose a DoS detection approach which uses the maximum likelihood criterion with the random neural network (RNN). Our method is based on measuring various instantaneous and statistical variables describing the incoming network traffic, acquiring a likelihood estimation and fusing the information gathered from the individual input features using likelihood averaging and different architectures of RNNs. We present and compare seven variations of it and evaluate our experimental results obtained in a large networking testbed.
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have evolved from simple acts of nuisance to a predominant network security threat with repercussions including significant financial losses [1] , endangerment of human life [2] and compromising of national security [3] . In the majority of DoS attacks the attacker acquires control of a large number of hosts, which are unaware that their machines are compromised, and orders them to simultaneously target a victim network node or set of nodes. The goal of a DoS attack is to deny service to legitimate users of the victim system by overwhelming its network or processing resources. A complete DoS defence system is a three-stage process, starting with (i) detection of the existence of an attack, which triggers (ii) classification of the incoming traffic into normal and attack and (iii) response against the attack traffic, either by dropping it or redirecting it to a trap. In this paper we concentrate on the first of the three stages. We describe a DoS detection mechanism and evaluate its performance in a large networking testbed.
Since DoS detection is often considered a pattern recognition problem where the aim is to observe and analyse the incoming traffic, various machine learning techniques have been proposed. The authors of [4] have designed the Statistical Pre-Processor and Unsupervised Neural Net based Intrusion Detector, in which the statistical pre-processor is used to extract features from packets, and the feature vector is changed to numerical form and fed to an unsupervised Adaptive Resonance Theory net. Neural networks for DoS detection are also used in [5] , which follows a data mining approach and in [6] , where a radial basis function neural network detector characterizes the incoming traffic as normal or DoS. In [7] , an Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System is used together with a Fuzzy C-Means Clustering Algorithm to detect DoS attacks and in [8] , a fuzzy classifier is described, where cross-correlation functions between incoming and outgoing traffic are used as inputs. In [9] another three computational intelligence techniques for DoS detection are compared, namely, support vector machines, multivariate adaptive regression splines and linear genetic programs, for each one of which the same authors present feature ranking algorithms in [10] .
The other important direction of DoS detection research is observing and analysing statistical properties and the energy content of normal and attack traffic. Normal Internet traffic is known to be long-range dependent and self-similar, but in the case of a DoS attack there are usually important deviations
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For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxm066 for these properties [11] . For this reason, in [12] , the selfsimilarity property of Internet traffic is used to detect DoS attacks. The authors use the packet number or packet size as the input feature and evaluate the Hurst parameter H. If the variance of H in consecutive time intervals is doubled their mechanism signals a DoS attack in progress. In [13] the incoming traffic is characterized as normal or DoS based solely on its autocorrelation function, while in [14] the entropy is computed as a measure of randomness, and the chi-square statistic as a measure of statistical significance and estimate of confidence, to detect the existence of an attack. Based on the observation that highly correlated packets are used in Dos attacks, while legitimate traffic is in some sense random, in [15] Kolmogorov complexity metrics are used for DoS detection. This technique is later improved in [16] , which uses a different Kolmogorov metric estimate to measure the correlation between the first and second halves of the strings forming the packets, and evaluates the fluctuations of the Kolmogorov complexity differentials. Also, since the energy distribution of normal traffic is known to be relatively stationary, while an attack usually results in changes in the energy distribution variance, in [17, 18] wavelets are used for computing the variations in the energy distribution in the incoming traffic.
Here, we attempt to bridge these two general directions of DoS detection, machine learning and information gathered with statistical methods. We have built a system which uses several statistical features deemed in the literature as most significant for a DoS attack, and combines the individual decisions in a machine learning fashion. We present and compare seven variations of it, which combine the maximum likelihood detection criterion and the random neural network (RNN). A similar approach to the maximum likelihood criterion has been used before for DoS detection [19] , but applied only on the rate of appearance of specific flags in the packets' headers, and in [20] to detect only one very specific type of attack. In our work we present a more general approach which aggregates likelihood estimation of heterogeneous statistical features and combine them in a neural network structure.
The RNN introduced by Gelenbe [21] is an alternative neural network model based on the spiking behaviour of the biological neuron instead of the classical approaches which assume analogue transmission of signals. In this paper, we exploit the capability of the RNN to model the excitatory and inhibitory interactions among its inputs for the case of malicious incoming traffic in a network. In fact, the experiments we conduct also exploit a RNN-based networking protocol, the Cognitive Packet Network (CPN) [22] , which is an autonomic Quality of Service (QoS)-driven routing protocol, where each flow specifies the QoS metric that it wishes to optimize. In our experiments we use the CPN to ensure that the traffic arrives to their destination quickly using the optimal routes.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give a detailed description of our choice of input features to be used in our two-class pattern classification problem of distinguishing between normal and attack traffic. We continue in Section 3 by summarizing the offline statistical information gathering step. Section 4 presents the core of the detection technique, including the decision making process and the methods for the fusion of the information gathered from the individual features. Then, Section 5 contains the performance evaluation of our detection mechanism in a networking testbed and we conclude in Sections 6 and 7 with a discussion on flash-crowds and our final remarks.
SELECTING THE INPUT FEATURES
The task of DoS detection can be formulated as a pattern classification problem, where the observed traffic is classified as normal or attack traffic. The Bayesian Decision Theory is a basic approach used in pattern recognition problems. It assumes the availability of probabilistic descriptions of the underlying features of a problem and aims to find a decision rule, which would minimize the risks encountered by the decision making process [23] . For a two-category classification problem, the practical utilization of the Bayesian Decision Theory entails evaluating the likelihood ratio l(x) ¼ f (xjw D )/f (xjw N ) and comparing it with a threshold T, where x is the measured value for a certain feature, and we have to decide whether the observed data point falls into the normal (w N ) or DoS (w D ) category. The value x is assigned to category w D if l(x) . T, or to w N , otherwise. The threshold T, generally empirically determined, depends on prior probabilities for the two types of categories and losses incurred by giving erroneous decisions, either as false alarms or as missed detections.
In our DoS detection mechanism, we monitor the incoming traffic to measure various features for decision making and we utilize the maximum likelihood detection criterion to take individual decisions for each of the input features. The collected information is then combined in a fusion phase to yield an overall decision about the traffic. We have used a likelihood ratio averaging method and implementations of two different architectures (feedforward and recurrent) of the RNN to compare. In the following sections we present our approach, including the selection of the input features, offline statistical information gathering and information fusion for the final decision making.
For any pattern classification problem, the selection of useful and information bearing input features constitutes a significant part of the solution. In our scheme we have used the features described below for a generic description of the monitored traffic. Our motivation behind this choice was to try to capture both the instantaneous behaviour and the longer-term statistical properties of the traffic, and also to employ input Page 2 of 11 G. Ö KE AND G. LOUKAS features that were easily measurable or calculable without high computational cost. Since the goal of the attacker is to deny or degrade the service for legitimate users by overwhelming either the processing or the networking resources of a victim network, a DoS detection mechanism should not further aggravate this condition with considerable overhead. Being able to measure them quickly is also a factor, since the faster detection decisions are taken the easier it is for the classification and response mechanisms to counter the attack.
(i) Bitrate. A very high rate of incoming traffic is by far the most conspicuous indicator of a flooding DoS attack. Similar measurements, such as the number of packets per flow are often used in detection mechanisms [5] . (ii) Rate of increase of bitrate. Another obvious characteristic of DoS attacks is the rate at which the incoming bitrate increases. For example, flooding attacks start with a long period of increasing bitrate, while in pulsing attacks there are consecutive periods of increasing and decreasing bitrate. (iii) Entropy. If the data has a probabilistic description, e.g.
in terms of probability distribution functions, the entropy will be inherently related to the randomness or uncertainty of information in the data. It has been reported in the technical literature that the entropy contained in normal internet traffic and traffic under DoS attack differ significantly [14] . In our work, we compute the entropy of the value of the incoming bitrate at the nodes we monitor according to [24] :
where f i are the probability density functions (pdf) obtained from the normalized histogram values for the bitrate, as explained in Section 4. This is expected to yield a higher value when the probability distribution expands over a wider range of values, indicating an increase in uncertainty. (iv) Hurst parameter. Another statistical attribute which exhibits different behaviour for normal and attack traffic is the self-similarity. It has been studied in detail in [11] , and has been proposed that the selfsimilarity properties of normal and attack traffic are distinctively different. The Hurst parameter is an indicator of the self-similarity of traffic and can be used in DoS detection [12] . In our approach we compute the actual value of the Hurst parameter for the incoming bitrate, for which we have used the (R/S) analysis, as described in [25] . If x is the bitrate of the incoming traffic, n is the observation time, and N is the total number of observation points, then (R/S) is given by Equation (2) .
The Hurst parameter and (R/S) N are related by
A natural consequence of high bitrate and building up of congestion is the increase in the packet delays. Still, to our knowledge it has not been used before as an attack indicator. For the fastest and least invasive way to detect changes in the delays, the node we monitor sends constantly packets at a very low rate to all its direct neighbours. By measuring the average round trip time (RTT) from the acknowledgements that return, we have a clear indication of the congestion near the node. (vi) Delay rate. As with bitrate, depending on the type of the attack and for its whole duration, the packet delays are expected to undergo significant changes. We are not aware of existing work using the change of the delay as a detection feature, but we consider it a natural next step.
OFFLINE STATISTICAL INFORMATION GATHERING
The probabilistic description of the network is acquired in the statistical information gathering phase which mainly consists of two steps. First, the pdf values are obtained for both normal and attack traffic and then the likelihood ratios are calculated based on the pdfs. At each victim candidate of the network, the incoming traffic is analysed offline to collect this statistical information. Estimates of pdf for both normal and attack traffic are computed for each of the input features described in Section 2. The pdfs are denoted by f feature (xjw N ) and f feature (xjw D ), where feature is replaced by bitrate, increase in bitrate (bit acceleration), entropy, Hurst parameter, delay and delay rate, respectively, x is the measured value of the feature from the available traffic data, w N denotes the normal traffic and w D the attack traffic. We have used the histogram method to compute the estimates of the pdf. With this method the range of observable values for a variable is divided into a number of intervals and for each interval, we compute the ratio of the number of data points that fall into it to the total number of data points available [23] .
In the second step, the pdf estimates obtained above for each input and for both traffic types are used to compute the likelihood ratios l feature of each feature: 
DETECTION DECISION
The statistical information collected about the network off-line is utilized during the decision making process, which comprises two steps. In the first step, decision for each feature is given individually, and the individual decisions are then combined in an information fusion step to yield a final outcome for the state of the traffic. The numerical values of the features are measured in real-time and a likelihood ratio for each feature is computed. Then, these values are aggregated in a higher-level decision making step, which provides a compensation for possible errors, and should decrease the rate of false alarms and missed detections. As a first approach to take into account all features, we have measured an average of the individual likelihood ratios. Then, for a more accurate approach, we employed a feedforward (f-RNN) and a recurrent (r-RNN) architecture of the RNN with the individual likelihood ratio values, histogram category values and actual values are inputs, for a total of seven different implementations of our generic detection technique.
Average likelihood ratio estimation
An uncomplicated and easily applicable method to combine the individual likelihood ratios is to evaluate the arithmetical average of them as given in Equation (3).
The value l final gives the overall likelihood ratio for the existence of a DoS attack at the victim candidate we monitor. The decision on whether the incoming traffic is normal or DoS is then taken by comparing this value to a specified threshold, which may or may not be dependent on the impact that the DoS attack is expected to have on the victim. This is an empirically determined threshold which represents the average of the individual thresholds discussed in Section 2.
Combining statistical information with the RNN
The RNN, proposed by Gelenbe [21] is a computational paradigm, inspired by the random spiking behaviour of the biological neurons. The RNNs are computationally efficient structures and they represent a better approximation of the true functioning of a biophysical neural network, where the signals travel as spikes rather than analogue signals. The strong analogy between queuing networks and the RNN make it a powerful tool for dealing with problems where excitation and inhibition among problem inputs are prevalent. The RNN has been successfully applied in various problems, including image processing [26] , pattern recognition [27] , and optimization [28] . In the RNN neurons exchange positive and negative impulse signals, with unit amplitude, which represent excitation and inhibition, respectively. Neurons accumulate signals as they arrive and positive signals are cancelled by negative signals. Neurons may fire if their potential is positive, to send signals either to other neurons or outside the network. The potential of neuron i at time t, also called as the state of the neuron, is denoted by k i (t). The state k i (t) may decrease if the neuron emits a signal, an inhibitory signal is received from another neuron in the network or if an exogenous inhibitory signal is received. Similarly, k i (t) increases if an exogenous excitatory signal or an excitatory signal from another neuron in the network is received. In RNN a signal may leave neuron i for neuron j as a positive signal with probability p þ (i, j), as a negative signal with probability p 2 (i, j), or may depart from the network with probability d(i), where
Equations (4) and (5) specify a way to compute the positive and negative weights.
where r (i) is a Poisson firing rate, with independent identically exponentially distributed interimpulse intervals:
The weights w may be interpreted in a way analogous to the weights in artificial neural networks, but they actually represent excitatory and inhibitory signal emission rates. The steady-state probability that the neuron i is excited is defined as: Equations (8) and (9) are used to solve for the neuron potentials which are defined in Equation (7) . RNNs can be designed in both feedforward and recurrent architectures (f-RNN and r-RNN). In our work we have implemented both architectures for the fusion of inputs to compare the results. The structure of the f-RNN we have designed is shown in Fig. 1 .
It consists of an input layer of 6 nodes, a hidden layer with 12 nodes and an output layer with 2 nodes. Each output node stands for a decision; attack or not. The final decision about the traffic is determined by the ratio of the two output nodes. The r-RNN structure we have designed is depicted in Fig. 2 . It consists of two layers, an input layer with 12 nodes and an output layer with 2 nodes. In the input layer, there are 2 nodes for each input variable; one for the excitatory signals and one for the inhibitory signals. Each node sends excitatory signals to nodes of the same type and inhibitory to the rest. At the output layer, 1 node sums up the excitatory and a second the inhibitory signals. Just as in the feedforward case, the decision is given by computing the ratio of the two output nodes.
For the implementation of the RNNs, we have used software developed in [29] . For both f-RNN and r-RNN we have used three different types of input: 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented and evaluated our detection mechanism on a networking testbed in our laboratory, which consists of 46 nodes connected with 100 MBits/s links according to the topology of Fig. 3 . Instead of following a random topology, we chose to recreate a representative academic one, which is the SwitchLAN 1 backbone network topology. We chose a specific node to play the role of the victim while the rest of the nodes send traffic to it according to a variety of datasets that we tried. In our experiments, we utilized traffic traces of DoS attacks designed both in our laboratory and by other academic sources: (i) normal traffic, (ii) attack traffic of our design slowly increasing, (iii) attack traffic downloaded from [30] representing rapid flood and (iv) attack traffic downloaded from the same source representing a pulsing attack, with traffic rates reciprocating between very low and very high values, which makes it challenging to detect.
We have used two types of RNN architecture, f-RNN and r-RNN, with three types of input for each feature: likelihood ratios, quantized histogram category values and actual values. Together with the method of simply averaging the likelihood ratios (for various values of decision threshold), we have tested a total of seven variations of the detection mechanism on our four traffic datasets. Each experiment lasts 120 s. In the attack cases, to illustrate the difference in the traffic and to see graphically the operation of the detection mechanism, we start with normal traffic on which we superimpose attack traffic for the time period between 50 and 100s. The last 20 s the network returns to its normal operation, as the attack sources stop sending traffic to the victim. We used a sampling time of 2 s. Table 1 summarizes the performance results of the detection mechanism in terms of average correct detection, false alarm rates and detection delays, while Figs. 4 -7 show the real-time detection decisions as time progresses. The y-axis in these graphs is in logarithmic scale with the detection metric being the ratio of the two output RNN nodes as described in Section 4. The decision threshold over which an attack is signalled is the RNN output ratio of 1. The closer the detection ratio is to 1 the less certain the mechanism is of its detection decision.
The results of Fig. 4 show that for normal traffic the RNNs signal correctly the absence of attack throughout the duration of the experiment, although not with the same degree of certainty, apart from the case of f-RNN with actual values which incorrectly signals an attack. Figures 5 -7 correspond to the three attack datasets that we used. All three implementations of the RNN detect the attacks quickly and have minimal missed detections and false alarms. The r-RNN with actual values had high detection rates, no false alarms and the lowest detection delay for all datasets, but also provided the lowest degree of certainty for its decisions by yielding values close to 1. The use of the quantized values of histogram categories appear to improve the correct detection rate even further, but at the expense of a few false alarms, while the likelihood ratio methods for both f-RNN and r-RNN performed at about the same level in both respects, but took a little longer to detect the pulsing attack (dataset3). We have also included the results for the average likelihood ratio method, which performs adequately for all datasets, but detects the attacks with longer delay (up to 12 s for dataset3).
We have also plotted some representative ROC curves for the seven variations, based on one of the datasets (Fig. 8) . The ROC curves are graphs of false positives versus true positives, to which we have referred in this paper as false alarms and correct detections, respectively. The observed behaviour in the ROC curves derived for all seven variations depict good discrimination properties between normal and attack traffic, with a slight advantage of the r-RNN with histogram categories and f-RNN with likelihood ratios. Page 6 of 11 G. Ö KE AND G. LOUKAS A DENIAL OF SERVICE DETECTOR Page 7 of 11 Looking at the overall performance of our detection mechanism, it emerges that apart from the f-RNN with actual values implementation, all methods are quite powerful detectors of attack traffic. In general, the r-RNN implementations are observed to be more accurate and slightly faster.
DISCUSSION ON FLASH-CROWDS
The flash crowd is a situation in which there is an unusually sharp increase in the number of legitimate visitors to a website due to some significant event. Although all traffic may be legitimate, the consequences are very similar to those of DoS attacks, A DENIAL OF SERVICE DETECTOR Page 9 of 11 such as network outages and dramatically reduced quality of service. In this paper we have not presented any work on flash-crowds. We could, however, discuss briefly how the differentiation between 'flash-crowd' and DoS attack could be incorporated in the detection mechanisms we presented. The flash-crowd can be added as a third category in our likelihood ratio approach. Then, the learning process of the detection mechanism and the training of the RNN will need sets of three types of traffic to operate; normal, attack and flashcrowd. In addition to the six inputs, the simplest new RNN structure would need at least 18 neurons in a hidden layer and three outputs.
A second option would be to first detect the existence of an attack in the ways presented in this paper, and then trigger a second separate mechanism, which should attempt to distinguish between the two by actively challenging the authenticity of the clients and exploiting their fundamental difference: flash crowd flows are generated by human users, while attack flows are generated by compromised computers. Thus, Reverse Turing tests have also been suggested to counter DDoS attacks against webservers [31] . The option of using our detection mechanisms to detect suspicious traffic and then try to actively distinguish between human-generated and computer-generated traffic may be more widely useful, since it does not depend on the statistical properties of the flash-crowd, which an attacker can easily mimic.
From the point of view of the users of the network, however, it is not important whether the outage they are experiencing is maliciously intended or a result of a flash-crowd. In either case, the detection mechanism should trigger a classification and response mechanism to retain the quality of service of the legitimate users. We have covered these elements of the DoS defence architecture in our previous papers [32, 33] .
CONCLUSIONS
We have described the design of a generic DoS detection scheme which reaches detection decisions accurately and in a timely fashion, by combining a statistical approach based on the maximum likelihood detection criterion and a machinelearning approach which uses the RNN. We first select input features describing various properties of the traffic and in an offline information gathering step we obtain the pdf estimates and evaluate likelihood ratios. Then, during the decision making step, we measure the features of the incoming traffic to reach detection decisions according to each feature. These are combined into an overall detection decision using both feedforward and recurrent architectures of the RNN.
This paper presents part of our ongoing work to develop a complete DoS defence architecture covering all three aspects mentioned in Section 1. In [32, 33] we detailed our approaches on classification and response, which naturally we intend to combine with the work presented here. While the proposed scheme already employs a wide variety of input features that capture both the instantaneous behaviour and the longer-term statistical properties of the traffic, it can be extended to incorporate additional features, which are crucial for specific types of attack. This would not alter the implementation of the RNN, apart from adding the necessary nodes in the same structure. Also, a way to improve the detection performance of our current mechanism for each individual network node employing it is to introduce cooperation with other nodes involved in the DoS defence. This we have already achieved in our work for classification and response, and would be particularly useful for detection too.
There are two major weaknesses in current DoS research, namely, the lack of standards of evaluation for the detection and defence methods and the scarce information on modern types of attacks. Launching real attacks against real networks with real legitimate users, is impractical, and this leaves the researchers with the option of less dependable datasets, e.g. simulated or acquired from outdated traffic traces. In this work we chose to use both, but for the reasons we explained we cannot argue on how these datasets compare against others and how realistic they are. We can, however, argue that our investigation method, using a real large networking testbed, instead of simulation, should provide a significant degree of realism. The experiments we conducted showed that by using a statistical approach as the input mechanism of a learning method is able to detect DoS threats in a timely fashion and can even very quickly identify the end of an attack, at least for the range of attacks that we investigated.
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